NCL: Textual Backdoor Defense Using Noise-augmented Contrastive Learning
Shengfang Zhai (Peking University); Qingni Shen (Peking University); Xiaoyi Chen (Peking University); Weilong Wang (Peking University); Cong Li (Peking University); Yuejian Fang (Peking University); Zhonghai Wu (Peking University)
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At present, backdoor attacks attract attention as they do great harm to deep learning models. By poisoning the training data, the adversary makes the model trained based on this dataset being injected with a backdoor. In the field of text, however, existing works do not provide sufficient defense against backdoor attacks. In this paper, we propose a Noise-augmented Contrastive Learning NCL framework to defend against textual backdoor attacks when training models with untrustworthy data. With the aim of mitigating the mapping between triggers and the target label, we add appropriate noise perturbing possible backdoor triggers, augment the training dataset, and then pull homology samples in the feature space utilizing contrastive learning objective. Experiments demonstrate the effectiveness of our method in defending three types of textual backdoor attacks, outperforming the prior works.